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Circuit Court of the United States, for the First Circuit.
EZEKIEL BYA.IM et al., vs. JOHN BULLARD et al.
A sale of the thing patented, to an agent of the patentee, employed by him to make
the purchase, on account of the patentee, is not per se an infringement. Accom-
panied by other circumstances, it may be evidence of an infringement.
This was an action on the case for an infringement of a patent
right for the manufacture of loco foco matches, belonging to the
plaintiffs. It came before the Court on a statement of facts, wherein
it was stated that before the date of the writ, the defendants sold
to an agent of the plaintiffs, who was employed by the plaintiffs to
make the purchase, matches of the value of six cents. That such
sale, if made to any other person than the plaintiffs or their agent,
would have been an infringement of the patent; and the questions
submitted were, whether such a sale was an infringement, and if so,
what was the measure of damages.
Charles Sumner, for the plaintiffs.
William Briglham, for the defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CURTIS, J.-The act of July 4, 1836, section 14, enables paten-
tees and their assignees to bring actions on the case, to recover
damages.for making, using, or selling the thing whereof the exclu-
sive right is secured by a patent. Two inquiries arise in this case:
the first is, whether upon the facts stated, the law imports either the
damage or the injury, both of which are necessary, by the common
law, to support an action on the case. The second is, whether an
action on the case for a violation of a patent-right, was intended to
be given by the patent act, where there was neither damage nor
injury received, according to the principles of the common law.
As to the injury, the general rule of the common law is, volenti non
fit injuria; and in accordance with this maxim, no one can main-
tain an action for a wrong, where he has consented or contributed
to the act of which he complains. And this principle has been
applied to numerous cases, in which, though the defendant was in
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the wrong, the plaintiff's negligence had contributed to produce the
consequential damages which were sought to be recovered in the
action. Here, the plaintiffs not only consented, but co-operated,
for through their agent they were themselves the purchasers. As
to the damage, it is true that in general, the law imports damage
from the violation of a right, but I am not aware that damage has
ever been presumed by law, from an act in which the plaintiff co-
operated, and which, therefore, must be supposed to have been
done for his own benefit, or at the least, not to have been to his
loss.
It was argued that ex necessitate rei, such a sale should be held
to be an infringement, because it is only by such evidence, that an
infringement of many patents can be shown. This may be suffi-
cient to prove that such a sale may be evidence of an infringement,
and that from such a sale, accompanied by other circumstances
likely to exist, and capable of being proved, if the defendant does
infringe, a jury would be warranted in finding an infringement by
sales to others than the patentee.
If the plaintiffs' agent purchased the matches at a shop where
matches and similar articles may be expected to be found for sale,
if they were sold to him in the usual course of the trade there, and,
if he saw others exposed for sale, it would be a natural inference
for a jury to make, that this was not the only parcel sold, that in
the course of the defendants' business, he had sold what he showed
himself willing and desirous of selling, and what customers are
frequently in the habit of buying, and I know of no rule of law
which would restrain them from drawing such an inference. But
it is a very different question whether such a sale is itself an in-
fringement. Thus, in Hall v. Boot, Webs., P. C. 100, the patent
was for a process of singeing off the superfluous fibres from lace,
by means of the flame of gas. The evidence of infringement was
that the defendant had secretly prepared an apparatus similar to
that used by the patentee, and had sold lace in a state to which it
would have been brought by using the patented process. So, in a
similar ruling, may be found'in Huddact v. Grinshaw, Davis, P. C.,
290, Bickford v. Skewes, 1 G. & D., 786, and many other cases.
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So in Keplinger v. Yownge, 10 Wheat., R. 358, it was held that
evidence from which a jury might infer that a patented machine
was let to the defendant under color of a contract to buy the pro-
duct of the machine, would authorize a finding of a use of the
machine by the defendant.
But in neither of these cases, would the naked facts sworn to
have amounted to an infringement. It remained for the jury to
draw from them the inference that the defendants had in fact used
the thing patented. Now, the argument ex necessitate, can extend
no further than the supposed necessity extends, and that is at the
utmost, only to make such a sale evidence of an infringement,
which stops short of its being an infringement. It was also argued
that this was not a sale to the plaintiffs, except by construction of
law, but only to their agent, and that for the benefit of patentees,
the law would not deem it the same as a sale to the plaintiffs. I
can see no reason for making a distinction between patentees and
other persons, in -this particular, and if I were -at liberty to disre-
gard a plain rule of law for the benefit of patentees, I should very
much doubt whether it would be for their advantage to hold that
the acts of their agents were not their own.
Nor can I find any solid foundation on which to rest the right of
a patentee to support an action on the case for the violation' of his
exclusive right, except that settled and reasonable common law
basis of all such actions-injury and damage; injury by a viola-
tion of the incorporeal right, and damage, at least nominal, pre-
sumed by the law to arise from such violation. Such, I understand
to have been the principle proceeded upon by Mr. Justice Story, in
"Whiternore v. Cutler, 1 Gall., R. 429, when he held that making a
machine for a philosophical experiment, or to test the sufficiency of
the specification, would not be an infringement; and in Sawin v.
Guild, 1 Gall., R. 487, where he says, the act must be with intent
to deprive the patentee of some lawful profit; and also by Mr.
Justice Patteson, in Jones v. Pearce, Web., P. C. 125, where he
excepts the making of a patented article for mere amusement, and
not for profit. In these cases, inasmuch as there was supposed to
be no damage, there was thought to be no action. And though I
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am rather disposed, with Mr. Justice Washington, (in Watson v.
Bladen, 4 Washington, R., 583,) to doubt whether the assumption is
correct, that in such cases there is no damage, yet, if the assump-
tion be correct, I think the inference is sound that no action lies.
It is true, some of the patent acts, which were repealed by the
act of 1836, gave an action for a sale, if made without the consent,
in writing, of the patentee or his assigns. But the law now in
force contains no such provision, and if it did, I should still be of
the opinion that a sale to the patentee himself was not such a sale
as was intended by the statute ; that no sale was within its mean-
ing, except one which would be within the terms of the grant con-
tained in the letters patent, which is a grant of an exclusive right
to make, use, and vend to others, to be used. In this case I am of
opinion that the sale to the plaintiffs' agent, was a sale to them, and
that such a sale is not per se an infringement. On a statement of
facts, as I am not at liberty to draw any inferences, and the judg-
ment must be for the defendants. Judgment for defendants.
Circuit Court of the United States for the Third Circuit.
CECIL OLIVER, ET AL. VS. DANIEL KAUFFMAN, STEPHEN WAKEFIELD,
AND PHILIP BRECKBILL.
1. Though the penalty given by the 4th section of the Act of 1793, with regard to
Fugitives from Labor, is repealed by the act of 1850, the reservation of the
right of action by the owners of such fugitives, forthe injuries enumerated
therein, is not affected.
2. "Notice" under the Act means knowledge ; it is not necessary that a specific writ-
ten, or verbal notice, from the owner of fugitive slaves, should be brought home
to the defendant, in an action for "harboring and concealing," in order to
make him liable.
3. "Harboring," within the act, is not synonymous with "concealment," but con-
sists in any entertainment or shelter for an unlawful purpose. Mere acts of
charity, however, will not constitute the offence.
4. In order to enable a plaintiff to recover in an action for "harboring and conceal-
ing" fugitive slaves, he must prove that the slaves were pursued by himself or
his agent, for the purpose of reclamation; and that the defendant, knowing
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them to be fugitives, harbored or concealed them in order to further their escape,
and to enable them to elude pursuit.
5. Where, in such action, it is shown that in consequence of the harboring and con-
cealment, the slaves escaped, and were lost to their owner, the measure of dam-
ages is the value of the slaves, with interest, if the jury think fit; otherwise,
however, if the interference of the defendant was only after the plaintiff had
abandoned all pursuit of his slaves.
6. In suei action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover entire damages against all en-
gaged in furthering the escape and in frustrating his pursuit.
7. Possession of slaves, otherwise shown to be such, is Prinafacie proof of title,
and no formal bill of sale is necessary to establish ownership.
8. In an action for "harboring and concealing," under the Act of 1793, it appeared
that the owner of the slaves, in carrying them from Arkansas to 'Maryland,
from which State they afterwards escaped, had passed with them on the National
Road over the State of Pennsylvania ; but that, on their arrival in Maryland,
they had been duly registered, according to law, as slaves, he!d, that such
transit had not rendered them free, but that their status -was to be determined
by the law of Maryland.
This was an action on the case for the harboring and concealment
of certain fugitive slaves, the property of the plaintiffs, whereby they
escaped and became lost to them, brought under the fourth section
of the Act of Congress of Feb. 12th, 1793. The suit had been origi-
nally begun in one of the courts of Pennsylvania, and a verdict reco-
vered, but the Superior Court, on error, held, reversing the judg-
ment, that no action lay at common law for the injury complained
of, and it was therefore recommenced here. (See Jauffmaa v.
Oliver, 10 Barr, 514.)
On the trial of the case, the material facts developed were
briefly as follows:
The plaintiffs were the minor children of Shadrach S. Oliver, a
citizen of Arkansas, who died in 1846, leaving the slaves in ques-
tion, and other property. His widow took out letters of adminis-
tration; and, there being no debts, an amicable division of the
estate was made, by which the slaves fell to the share of the plain-
tiffs. In the early part of 1847 Mrs. Oliver and her children re-
moved to Maryland, carrying the slaves with them. In their jour-
ney, after taking the usual route up the Ohio, they passed in stages
on the National Road across the State of Pennsylvania, stopping at
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Uniontown to get food, but making, otherwise, no pause. On their
arrival in Maryland, the slaves were duly registered at Hagers-
town, in that State, under a statute making registry necessary
under the circumstances.
In October, 1847, thirteen of the slaves escaped into Pennsylva-
nia. Immediate pursuit was begun, and after a few days, some
information was obtained, by which the slaves were traced to the
barn of Kauffman, one of the defendants, near Shippensburg. The
agent of the plaintiffs proceeded there at once, but was unsuccess-
ful in his attempt to recover them ; and, after other efforts, .was
obliged to give up his search as fruitless. Witnesses were intro-
duced on the part of the plaintiff, to prove that the slaves had
been actually received and concealed by Kauffman, with knowledge
of their condition; and that he and the other defendants were
engaged in procuring their escape. This was met, however, by con-
tradictory testimony on the part of the defence; and on all the
principal points in the case the evidence was entirely conflicting.
The Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 1847, § 7, which was
in force at the time of the transit of the Oliver family, with the
slaves, across the State, repeals so much of the Act of 1780 "as
authorizes the masters or owners of slaves to bring and retain
such slaves within the Commonwealth, for the period of six months,
in involuntary servitude, or for any 1)eriod !f time whatsoevcr." It
was urged, amongst other grounds of defence, that, under this act
the voluntary taking of the slaves through Pennsylvania rendered
them free.
In the course of the argument, allusion was made, on both sides,
to the late trials in this Court for treason, arising out of the riot
and homicide at Christiana ; and the Report of the Attorney Gene-
al of Maryland, made to the Executive of that State.
The case was argued by
IT. IlT. Watts and C. B. Penrose, for Plaintiffs.
Jf. B. eed and D. P. Brown, for Defendants.
The charge to the jury was delivered by GRIER J. (after stating
the facts and pleadings.)
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In the performance of your duty on this subject, it will be
proper that you suffer no prejudice to affect your minds, either for
or against either of the parties to this suit. The odium attached to
the name of "abolitionist" (whether justly or unjustly, it matters
not), should not be suffered to supply any want of proof of the
guilty participation of the defendants in the offence charged, even
if the testimony in the case should satisfy you that the defendants
entertained the sentiments avowed by the class of persons designa-
ted by that name. The defendants are on trial for their acts, not
for their opinions. Beware, also, that the occasional insolence and
violent denunciation of the South be not permitted to prejudice
your minds against the just rights guaranteed to them by the Con-
stitution and laws of the Union. An unfortunate occurrence has
taken place since the former trial of this case, which, as it is a
matter of public history, and as such has been introduced into the
argument of this case, it becomes the unpleasant duty of the Court
to notice in connection with this portion of our remarks. A worthy
citizen of Maryland, in attempting to recapture a fugitive, was
basely murdered by a mob of negroes on the southern borders of
our State. That such an occurrence should have excited a deep
feeling of resentment in the people of that State, was no more
than might have justly been expected. That this outrage was the
legitimate result of the seditious and treasonable doctrines dili-
gently taught by a few vagrant and insane fanatics, may be admit-
ted. But by the great body of the people of Pennsylvania, the occur-
rence was sincerely regretted, and an anxious desire was enter-
tained that the perpetrators of this murder should be brought to
condign punishment. Measures were taken, even at the e:ipense of
sending a large constabulary and military force into the neighbor-
hood, to arrest every person, black and white, on whom rested the
least suspicion of participation in the offence. A large number of
bills of indictment were found against the persons arrested for
high treason, and one of them was tried in this Court. The trial
was conducted by the Attorney General of the State of Maryland;
and although it was abundantly evident that a riot and murder had
been committed, by some persons, the prosecution wholly failed in
10
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proving the defendant, on trial, guilty of the crime of treason with
which he was charged. But, however much it was to be regretted
that the perpetrators of this gross offence could not be brought to
punishment, the Court and jury could not condemn, without proof,
any individual, to appease the justly offended feelings of the people
-of Maryland. Unfortunately, a different opinion with regard to
our duty in this matter, seems to have been entertained by persons
holding high official stations in that State; and certain official
statements have been published, reflecting injuriously upon the
people of Pennsylvania and this Court, which have tended to excite
feelings of resentment, and to keep up a border feud, which, if
suffered to have effect in our Courts, or in the jury-box, may tend
to prejudice the just rights of the people of Maryland, and of the
plaintiffs in this case. These offensive documents, I have reason
to believe, are neither a correct exhibition of the good sense and
feelings of the people of that State, nor of the legal knowledge and
capacity of its learned and eminent bar. It would do them great
wrong to suppose them incapable of understanding the legal pro-
ceedings, which have been made the subject of so much reprehen-
sion, or capable of misrepresenting them.
It is your duty to treat with utter disregard ignorant and mali-
cious vituperation of fanatics and demagogues, whether it come
from North or South, and give to the respective parties such pro-.
tection of their respective rights as the Constitution and the laws
of our country secure to them.
I have urged these considerations on your attention more at
length, because they have been the subject of much comment by
counsel.
The foundation of the legal rights now asserted on behalf of the
plaintiffs, is found in the Constitution of the United States.
The provision of the Constitution (Art. 4th, § 3) is as follows:
"No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation thereof, be discharged from such labor or service, but
shall be delivered up ' on claim of the party to whom such service
or labor may be due.' It declares, also (Art. 6, § 2), "That this
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Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance
thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
By virtue of this clause in the Constitution, the master might
have pursued and arrested his fugitive slave in another State ; he
might use as much force as was necessary for his reclamation; he
might bind and secure him so as to prevent a second escape. But
as the exercise of such a power, without some evidence of legal
authority, might lead to oppression and outrage, and the master,
in the exercise of his legal rights, might be obstructed and hin-
dered, it became necessary for Congress to establish some mode by
which the master might have the form and support of legal process,
and persons guilty of improper interference with his rights might
be punished. For this purpose the Act of Congress of 12th Feb.,
1793, was passed. By the 3d See. of this Act, the master or his
agent is empowered to seizet and arrest the fugitive, and take him
before a Judge or Magistrate, and, having proofs of his ownership,
obtain a certificate, which should serve as a legal warrant for re-
moving the fugitive.
The 4th Sec. describes four different offences-ist, knowingly
and wilfully obstructing the claimant in seizing or arresting the
fugitive; 2d, rescuing the fugitive when so arrested; 3d, harbor-
ing ; 4th, concealing such person after notice that he is a fugitive
from labor.
Under this statute you will observe that a penalty of five hun-
dred dollars is incurred for harboring or concealing a fugitive,
which the party injured may recover; but the present action is not
for this penalty. In this suit, the plaintiff is only entitled to re-
cover the damages he has actually sustained by the acts of the de-
fendants. You will first determine whether the proof, under the
principles here laid down, entitles the plaintiff to recover. And if
they be so entitled, you will then have to consider the amount of
damages.
In order to entitle the plaintiffs to your verdict, they must have
proved to your satisfaction:
1. That the slaves or persons held to labor, mentioned in the
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declaration, or some of them, were, by the laws of Maryland, the
property of the plaintiffs-dr, as the statute expresses it, that their
labor and services were due to the plaintiffs for life, or a term of years.
2. That these persons so held to labor escaped to the State of
Pennsylvania.
3. That the defendants, or some of them, aware of these facts,
(having notice or knowledge that the persons harbored or concealed
were fugitives from labor), did harbor or conceal them, contrary to
the trhe intent and meaning of the statute.
4. And if you find these facts in favor of the plaintiffs, the
amount of the damage, injury, or loss, sustained by the plaintiffs
in consequence of such harboring and concealing.
, On the first two points, there is no contradictory testimony. But
while the escape of the twelve negroes has not been disputed, the
defendants' counsel contend that the facts, as proved, do not show
that the fugitives were slaves, or the property of the plaintiffs, but
on the contrary that they were free. L,
It has not been disputed that the fugitives were the property
of Shadrach S. Oliver at the time of his death in Arkansas. By
the laws of that State, the widow has a right to a third of them, if
treated either as real or personal estate. But, however the law
might divide them, the widow and children, as entitled to the suc-
cession, after the payment of debts, could, by any family arrange-
ment, settlement, or understanding, divide the property at their
own discretion, and third persons would have no right to dispute
its validity. Slaves, though for some purposes treated as real
property, are chattels, and like other chattels may pass by delivery,
without any formal bill of sale. Possession of them is therefore
prima fadie evidence of title.
It has been contended that these slaves became free by the act
of the plaintiffs in voluntarily bringing them into the State of
Pennsylvania.
This question depends on the law of Maryland, and not of Penn-
sylvania. This Court cannot go behind the status of these people
where they escaped. We know of no law or decision of the
Courts of Maryland, which treats a slave as liberated, who has
been conducted by his master along the national road through
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the State of Pennsylvania. On this subject, Lord Mansfield has
said some very pretty things (in the case of Somerset), which are
often quoted as principles of the common law. But they will per-
haps be found, by examination of later cases, to be classed with
rhetorical flourishes rather than legal dogmas. Since the former
trial of this case, the point has been aecided in the Supreme Court,
as I think. But, however that may be, the point is ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs, for the purposes of the present case, as we desire to have
your verdict on the facts of the case, which are so much contested.
The great question, then, to which your attention will be direct-
ed, is whether the defendants, or any one of them, are guilty of
harboring or concealing the fugitives as laid in the declaration.
Whether the plaintiffs could have sustained an action on the case
on the mere guarantee of their rights as contained in the Constitu-
tion, we need not inquire. The action has been instituted with
reference to the terms used in the Act of Congress of 1793. The
fine inflicted by that act can be no longer recovered, because the
Act of 1850, having changed the penalty, has thereby repealed
the Act of 1793 to the extent to which it has been thus supplied.
But the statute, so far as it gave an action on the case for harbor-
ing and concealing, has not been supplied or repealed.
As to the nature of the harboring and concealing (which is the
substance of the complaint in this case), and which would subject
the defendants to liability in this form of action, I shall repeat the
observations made on a former occasion.
1st. What is meant by "notice ;" and, 2d, what constitutes har-
boring.
On the first point, the Court has been relieved from much diffi-
culty by a late case tried before Mr. Justice McLean, in Ohio ;
and which has been affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States (see TVansandt v. Jones, 2d McLean, and same case, 5th
Howard, 216). In that case it was decided that the word "notice,"
as used in this act, means knowledge ; that it is not necessary that
a specific written, priated, or verbal notice, from the owner be
brought home to the defendant, but that it is sufficient if the evi-
dence show that he knew the person he harbored or concealed was
a fugitive from labor.
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The word "harbor" is defined by lexicographers by the words,
to entertain, to shelter, to secure, to secrete. It evidently has
various shades of meaning not exactly expressed by any'synonyme.
It has been defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary "to receive clan-
destinely, and without lawful authority, a person, for the purpose
of concealing him, so that another, having the right to the lawful
custody of such person, shall be deprived of the same." This defi-
nition is quoted in the opinion of the Court, as delivered by Mr.
Justice Woodbury, in Jones v. Transandt, 5 Howard, 227. But
though the word may be used in the complex meaning there given
to it, it does not follow that all these conditions are necessary ele-
ments in its definition. Receiving and entertaining a person clan-
destinely, and for the purpose of concealment, may well be called
harboring,, as the word is sometimes used. Yet one may harbor
without concealing. He may afford entertainment, lodging, and
shelter to vagabonds, gamblers, and thieves, without the purpose
or attempt at concealment, and it may be correctly affirmed of him
that he harbors them.
The Act of Congress, by using the terms "harbor and conceal,"
evidently assumed that the terms were not synonymous, and that
there might be a harboring without concealment. The act seems
to be drawn with great care and accuracy, and bears no marks of
that slovenly diction which sometimes characterizes Acts of Assem-
bly, where numerous synonymes are heaped together, and words
are multiplied only to increase confusion and obscurity. But
neither in legal use nor in common parlance, is the word harbor
precisely defined by the words entertain or shelter. It implies
impropriety in the conduct of the person giving the entertainment
or shelter, in consequence of some imputation on the character'
of the person who receives it. An inn-keeper is said to entertain
travellers and strangers, not to harbor them; but may be accused
of harboring vagabonds, deserters, fugitives, or thieves, persons
whom he ought not to entertain.
It is too plain for argument, that this act does not intend to make
common charity a crime, or treat that man as guilty of an offence
against his neighbor who merely furnishes food, lodging, or raiment
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to the hungry, weary, or naked wanderer, though he be an ap-
prentice or a slave. On the contrary, it contemplates not only
an escape of the slave, but the intention of the master to reclaim
him. It points out the mode in which this reclamation is to be
made, and it is for an unlawful interference or hinderance of this
right of reclamation, secured to the master by the Constitution and
laws, that this action is given.
The harboring made criminal by this act, then; requires some
other ingredient besides a mere kindness or charity rendered to the
fugitive. The intention or purpose which accompanies the act
must be to encourage the fugitive in his desertion of his master, to
further his escape, and impede and frustrate his reclamation. "This
act must evince an intention to elude the vigilance of the master,
and be calculated to obtain the object." (2 McLean, 608.)
This mala men8, or fraudulent intent required by the act to con-
stitute illegal harboring, is not to be measured by the religious or
political notions of the accused, or the correctness or perversion of
his moral perceptions. Some men may conceive it a religious duty
to break the law, but the law will-not receive this as an excuse.
If the defendant was connected with any society or association
for the purpose of assisting fugitives from other States to escape
from their masters, and, in pursuance of such a scheme, afforded
this shelter and protection to the fugitive in question, he would be
legally liable to the penalty of this act, however much his con-
science, or that of his associates, might approve of his conduct.
The difference between the action for the penalty and the action
on the case, is this: The defendants might be liable for the penalty
if they illegally harbored and concealed the fugitives, even though
the master may have afterwards reclaimed them.
But in an action on the case for damages, the plaintiff must show
that the slaves were lost to him through the illegal interferance of
the defendants, or that some other appreciable loss, injury, or
damage, was suffered by him in consequence thereof. In the first
case, he would recover the whole value of the slaves as dama-
ges ; in the latter, only to the amount of loss or actual damage
which he shows he has sifffered.
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If the owner of the fugitive does not think fit to pursue, in
order to reclaim them, he cannot complain that those who have
merely harbored them after their escape have injured him, unless
he can connect such persons with the original escape of the slaves,
and show that they seduced the" slaves, and helped them to escape
from the possession of their master. If the master had entirely
abandoned the pursuit of his slaves and given up all attempts' to
reclaim them, before interference of the defendants, the whole
value of the slaves could hardly be claimed as the measure of his
damages, as their loss could not be then imputed to their harbor-
in (r
But if the owner or his agent, pursuing the fugitives for the
purpose of reclamation, should trace them to the premises of a
certain individual, and could trace them no farther,'because they
had been harbored and concealed, and carried away secretly by
night, and delivered to another, who continued the same process,
and the pursuit of the claimant was thus baffled, no one of those
individuals thus interfering could be suffered to allege that his in-
terference did not cause the loss of the fugitives, or that their
value was not a proper measure of damages in an action for such
harboring. If a number of persons combine'together to commit
a trespass or wrong, they are liable to damages to the extent of
the whole injury. The injured party may recover judgment for
the whole damage against each, and elect de melioribus damnis,
as he can have but one compensation. And where a number of
persons are sued for a joint trespass or tort, and the plaintiff can
prove any one of them to be guilty, the jury may find the others not
guilty, and assess the whole damages against that one, even though
many others, known or unknown, may have combined with that
one to do the act, and have not been sued. Although the plaintiff
can recover but one -satisfaction, the damages are 'indivisible, and
each joint trespasser is liable for the whole.
It will be for you, gentlemen of the jury, to apply these princi-
ples to the facts of the case before you. The evidence is very
contradictory. In some cases, testimony apparently conflicting
may be reconciled without imputing corrupt perjury to either side.
RECENT AMIERICAN DECISIONS.
It would be difficult, perhaps, for the most enlarged charity to do
so in this case. The whole case has been argued before you with
very great ability by the learned counsel, and as you are the sole
judges of the facts, the Court do not think it necesary to make
any remarks upon them.
If, in your judgment, the hypothesis of the defendants' counsel
is supported by the evidence; if Mr. Breckbill was merely a spec-
tator, without counsel, interference or assistance; if Mr. Weakley
did not participate in the transaction at all, you should find them
not guilty. If you believe, also, that Kauffman did not assist in
harboring, secreting or deporting the slaves, but merely fed them
out of charity, and suffered them to rest for a few hours in
his barn; that they were brought there without his knowledge,
consent, or approbation, and taken away without his assistance, or
any act of his, to enable them to elude the pursuit of their owners,
or to further their escape, your verdict, should be in his favor also.
If, on the contrary, you find the hypothesis of the plaintiffs'
counsel to be a true one; if, from the facts in evidence, you believe
that certain persons in the region of country where the defendants
reside, and including them, or any of them, were known as persons
willing to assist fugitives to escape; that for this reason they were
brought to the premises of Kauffman, by some person, known or
unknown, who was assisting the slaves to escape; if they were re-
ceived by him, harbored and secreted in his barn, then taken away
by him, or by his agents or servants, after night, in order to assist
them to escape, and to elude pursuit ;. if the slaves were thus trans-
ferred by him, with the countenance, counsel and assistance of
Breckbill, to the barn of Stephen Weakley; if Weakley kept them
secreted in his barn, and removed them on the following night to
places unknown, and the pursuit of the owners of these slaves was
thus baffled, you should find for the plaintiffs the full value of the
slaves in damages, as against all the defendants, or such of them
as you believe from the evidence to have had an active participa-
tion in the offence.
In fine, the burden, of proof is on the plaintiffs, and, in order to
support their action, you must find from the evidence-
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1st. That the plaintiffs were owners of the slaves named and
described in the declaration.
2d. That those slaves escaped from the State of Maryland.
3d. That they were pursued by the agent of the owners for the
purpose of reclaiming them.
4th. That the defendants, or some of them, knowing them to be
fugitives, harbored and concealed them, in order to further their
escape and enable them to elude pursuit.
5th. And if, in consequence of such harboring, the slaves did
escape, and were lost to their owners, you shall find the value of
the slaves as damages, with interest, if you see fit.
You will suffer no prejudice to operate on your minds, in favor
or against either of the parties, on account of any peculiar notions
either you or they may entertain on the subject of slavery. You
are sworn to render a true verdict. In order to do this, it must
be according to the law of the land, rendering equal and exact
justice to both parties.
Court of Chancery. Vermont, NYovember, 1852.
BYRO-T STEVENS V. THE RUTLAND AND fBURLINGTON RAIL-ROAD
COMPANY, ET AL.
1. It is a settled principle in equity, that a majority of a joint stock association can-
not use the joint property except within the scope of their business, without being
liable to be restrained by injunction.
2. A corporator would be bound by a modification of a charter by legislative action,
which is only an auxiliary, but not afundamental change.
8. Where a corporation procures from the Legislature, by a supplemental act,
authority to make a fundamental change in their charter, as to extend their rail-
way to a different point, and thus really construct a new road, the rights of an
individual corporator, as such, who does not assent thereto, are not thereby
affected, although there be a majority vote of the corporation, accepting the act.
This is a bill preferred before the Chancellor of the third Judi-
cial Circuit, against the Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company
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and three of its directors, by a stockholder in the Company; the
object of which is to obtain an injunction against the defendants,
restraining them from applying the funds of the Corporation, or
pledging its credit, for the purpose of constructing a railroad from
Burlington, in the County of Chittenden, to Swanton, in the County
of Franklin.
It appears that the Legislature of this State, at their session in
1843, granted a Charter of Incorporation to divers individuals, and
to their successors, for the purpose of building a railroad from some
point in Burlington, through the Counties of Addison, Rutland and
Windsor or Windham, to some point on the west bank of the Con-
necticut river, under the name of the Champlain and Connecticut
River Railroad Company. This name was subsequently changed
by the Legislature, to the Rutland and Burlington Railroad Com-
pany. The charter, among other things, provides that the capital
stock of the Company shall be one million of dollars, with the right
in the Corporation to increase it to an amount sufficient to complete
said road, and furnish all necessary apparatus for conveyance.
The Company, after having procured some minor amendments to
the charter, which it is not necessary to notice, caused the books
to be opened, the stock to be taken, and organized in due time,
under the law, and have caused the road to be constructed, and it
has for some time been in successful operation. The plaintiff, upon
opening the books, subscribed for five shares of the capital stock,
has regularly paid his subscription, each share being one hundred
dollars, and he has ever since been the owner of said shares. After
this road was constructbd, and while in operation, the Legislature
of this State passed an additional act to authorise this Corporation
to extend their railroad, at any time within three years, from Bur-
lington to Swanton, in the County of Franklin, it being a distance
of about thirty miles. This additional act also provides, that the
Corporation, in the construction of this extension, shall have all the
rights and privileges, and be subject to all the liabilities contained
in the original charter, and the previous supplementary acts. The
orator then proceeds to allege, that the Directors, who are made
parties to this bill, and without authority from the Board of Direc-
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tors or from the Corporation, and without any previous notice, and
in bad faith, and for the purpose of prejudicing the interests of the
shareholders, procured the Legislature to pass this additional act of
1850, and have caused it to be accepted by the Board of Directoys;
and that the Directors have caused a meeting of the stockholders
to be called, to see if they will accept of this act, as an amendment
to their charter; and that they threaten, if this act shall be
accepted by a majority of the Corporation, that they will proceed
immediately in the construction of this extension, and for that pur-
pose will apply the funds and pecuniary resources of the Corpora-
tion, and pledge its credit, to whatever extent ihey shall find it
necessary, to effect the object; and this, too, without the consent
and against the will of the minority of the stockholders, and par-
ticularly the orator, who alleges that he has not, and will not con-
sent to accept of said act of 1850, and construdt said extension,
and that he has, ever since the passage of the act, requested the
defendants to desist from the same.
These are the material facts stated in the bill; which has been
verified by affidavit. No affidavits have been filed on the other
side, and no application for a delay of the hearing, for the purpose
of answering the bill; and since it has been pending before the
Chancellor, it appears the Corporation, at a meeting previously
called for that purpose, have voted to accept of the act of 1850, as
an amendment of their charter.
The question is, can the orator, upon such a state of facts, claim,
at the hands of the Chancellor, his injunction?
This case was twice argued.
For the complainant, Messrs. Jlarch and Aldis.
For the defendants, Messrs. Smalley, White and Ch. Linsley.
BENNETT, Crn.-It is an admitted principle, that in partnerships,
and joint stock associations, they cannot, by a vote of the majority,
change or alter their fundamental articles of copartnership or asso-
ciation, against the will of the minority, however small, unless there
is an express or implied provision in the articles themselves that
they may do it. It is equally well settled, that a court of Chan-
cery will, upon the application of an individual member of a part-
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nership or joint stock association, restrain, by injunction, the
majority from using the funds or pledging the credit of the part-
nership or association inna business not warranted, and not within
the scope of their fundamental articles of agreement. Courts of
equity treat such proceedings by a majority, as a fraud upon the
other members, which they will neither sanction nor permit. To
prevent the commission of fraud, by injunction, has been one of
the earliest and most appropriate heads of equity jurisdiction, as
well as to relieve against it, when committed. It was upon this
principle that Lord Eldon, when High Chancellor, upon the ap-
plication of an individual member of a company, which had
been organised for the purpose of carrying on a fire and life insu-
rance business, restrained the company, by injunction, from embark-
ing also in the marine insurance 'business; though the applicant
had paid into the funds of the Company only X150, as a deposit
upon fifteen shares: and the company gotten up by the _Roths-
childs, of England, and composed of six or seven hundred individu-
als, with a capital of five millions sterling. See .Yatusch v. Irving
and others, Gow on Part., Appendix, p. 576. The same pinci-
ple was applied to a corporation by the Vice Chancellor, and by
Lord Chancellor Brougham, in the- case of Ware v. T]e Grand
Junction Water Company, 2 Rus. and Mylne, 461 S. C. 1-3 Cond.
Ch. Rep. 126. The Vice Chancellor, upon the application of a
single shareholder, restrained the Corporation, not only from
embarking their funds and credit in a matter beyond the provisions
of their charter, but also from applying to Parliament for a change
in the charter, which woul. warrant it. The change desired to be
made in that case was, that the Company might be enabled to get
their supply'of water by means of an aqueduct from the river Colne,
instead of the river Thames, as authorised to do under their original
charter. Lord Brougham, on appeal, dissolved that part of the
injunction, it is true, which restrained the Company from applying
to Parliament for an alteration of the charter in the particular
desired, but retained the residue of it. So in Cunliff v. The Man-
ehe~ter and Bolton Canal Company, 13 Cond. Equity Rep. 1S1, n.
the Vice Chanceilor restrained the Corporation, upon the application
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of a share holder, from applying to Parliament for a change in
their charter, to enable them to convert a portion of their canal
into a railway, and from applying any of the corporate funds to
the proposed object.
It was well conceded, in the argument on the defence, that if the
Corporation had been about to proceed to a construction of the
contemplated extension without the act of 1850, it would have
been a proper case for an injunction. The only question which
can be open to debate is, as to what shall be the effect of the
act of 1850, and a subsequent adoption of the act by the, Cor-
poration, upon the individual rights of a share holder who does
not assent to its adoption? If bound by it, there is no equity in
this Bill. It is, and must be admitted, that the Legislature have
no constitutional power, unless it be reserved in the grant, to change
or alter an act of incorporation without consent, and thereby cast
upon the company new and additional obligations, or take from
them rights guaranteed under the original charter. And indeed,
this the Legislature have not attempted to do. It also is equally true,
that it is a part of the law of corporations, that they act according
to the voice of the majority. But it is to be remembered, that this
is not a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to protect himself in any
corporate right, but in his own individual right, growing out of the
fact of his having become a corporator, by his subscription, and its
payment, to the capital stock of the Company. One of an aggre-
gate corporation may contract with the company, as well as a third
person; and the rights of the individual so contracting are no more
distinct and independent, in the one case, than in the other. The
plaintiff, by his subscription, assumed to pay to the corporation,
and only for the purpose specified in the charter, its amount,
according to the assessments; and there was, at the same time, a
TRUST created, and an implied assumption, on the part of the Cor-
poration, to apply it to that object, and none other. The Corpo-
ration also assumed upon themselves to account to this corporator
for his share of the dividends, when this road Should be completed
and put in operation; and for his share of capital stock, though
not in numero. The charter, in this case, gives to the State the
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right to purchase out the road of the Corporation, after a given
number of years, upon certain terms therein specified. The rela-
tion between each original share holder and the Corporation is the
same. The obligation of the contract between the Legislature and
the Corporation, after an acceptance of the charter, is no more
sacred than that which is created between the Corporation and the
individual corporator. Does any one suppose the Legislaturecould,
without the consent of parties, absolve a corporator from liability
on his subscription to the Corporation, or modify it? and can they
do the reverse of it? It is conceded that there is a class of altera-
tions in a charter, which the Corporation may obtain and adopt,
that would not so essentially change the contract as to absolve the
coporator from his subscription, or give him a right to complain in
a court of justice, in case he had previously paid it.
Where the object of the modification or alteration of the charter
is auxiliary to the original object of it, and designed to enable the
Corporation to carry into execution the very purpose of the original
grant, with more facility and more beneficially than they otherwise
could, the individual corporator, can not complain; and I should
apprehend it would make no difference with the rights of a Corpo-
ration, in such a case, though he could show that the charter, as
amended, was less beneficial to the corporators than the original
one would have been. The ground upon which such amendments
bind the corporator, I deem to be his own consent. Wheir he
becomes a corporator by his signing for a portion of the capital
stock, he in effect agrees to the by-laws, rules, and votes of the
Company, and there is an implied assent, on his part, with the
Corporation, that they may apply for and adopt such amendments
as are within the scope, and designed to promote the execution of
the original purpose; and he signs, and the Corporation receive his
subscription, subject to such implied contingency: and if we regard
it in the nature of a license only, it would not alter the principle.
Both parties having acted upon it, it would not be countermand-
able.
But suppose the object of the alteratdlon-is a fundamental change
in the original purpose, and designed to superadd to it something
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which is beyond and aside of it; does the same principle apply?
In the case of the Union Lock and Canal Company v. Towne, 1
N. H. Rep. 44, the Company, under an act of the Legislature of
New Hampshire, passed Dec. 1808, were incorporated for t7he pur-
pose of rendering the Merrimack river navigable from Reed's
Ferry to Amoskeag Falls; and in this charter the Company were
authorised to purchase and hold real estate not exceeding six acres,
and to exact and collect toll for a period of forty years only, at a
rate not averaging more than twelve per cent. per annum on the
capital stock invested. In June, 1809, (the 23d) the Legislature
passed an additional act, which took off all limitation as to the rate
of toll, and time of its duration, and authorised the Company to
purchase and hold real estate not exceeding one hundred acres.
In 1812, the Legislature passed another act, conferring the right
upon John L. Sullivan and others, to lock Cromwell Falls, on the
same river, which was a point not embraced within the termini of
the act of 1808; but in other respects the acts were similar; and
in this act, Sullivan and his associates were authorised to transfer
the charter to the Union Locks and Canal Company, so as to be
considered a mere addition to that charter. It was transferred and
accepted in August, 1813. The act of June, 1809, was passed
upon the petition of the Corporation, and the defendant became a
member of the Corporation in that summer; but whether before or
after the 23d day of June, (the day of its passage,) does not dis-
tinctly appear; though the Court say, from the declaration it
appears all the assessments were made after that date, and a part
after the passage of the act of 1812, and the acceptance of it. It
became material to pass upon the effect of both acts. The Court,
in a well considered opinion given by Judge Woodbury, held that
each of the subsequent statutes created such a fundamental change
in the original charter as to absolve the defendant from all liability
for assessments made after the passage of the additional acts; there
being no evidence to show that he had ever personally assented to
them.
In the Middlesex Turnpike Corporation v. Lock, 8 Mass. Rep.
268, the Court held that a variation and change in the course of
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the turnpike road, from that which was prescribed in the original
charter, was such a fundamental alteration as to absolve the sub-
scribers from the payment of assessments made after the amend-
ment to the charter, upon a subscription for stock, made before.
The supplementary act, in that case, was passed upon the applica-
tion of the Directors of the Company, with the assent of the Cor-
poration, at a meeting duly called for that purpose; and the altera-
tion proposed in the act, was in the course of the turnpike road
from Biskit Bridge, in Tyngsboro', to the Fork, in Bedford.
The case of the same Company v. Swan, 10 Mass. Rep. 384,
arose under the same charter, as amended, and was brought to
recover assessments on Swan's subscription, made after the amend-
ment. The case differed from the one in the 8th vol. in this:
Swan was a Director in the Company, and joined in the application
to the Legislature for a change in the charter, and when it was
claimed by the counsel, that that fact, in connection with the fact
that he was officially concerned in making the road under the
amended charter, was equivalent to an individual assent to the
amendment, and bound him personally; the Court say they can
not admit the soundness of the position. See, also, the same plain-
tiff v. Walker, 10 Mass. Rep. 390. I cannot see that the case
of Revere v. The Boston Copper Company, 15 Pick. Rep. 351,
363, cited by the defendant's counsel, makes for them, but rather
the reverse. The object of the suit was to recover an indemnity,
which the plaintiff claimed he had sustained in consequence of the
defendant's refusal to employ him, and pay him a salary agreeably
to a special promise which he had made with them, which by its
terms, was limited to the 'time for which the Corporation was
established, provided the plaintiff should so long live, and. continue
to perform his part of the agreement. The plaintiff was a stock-
holder, and took charge of the business as the agent of the compa-
ny. The business of the Company proved unprofitable, after a
trial of more than four years, and a majority of the Corporation
voted to dissolve the Company, and wind up its concerns; and for
that purpose appointed trustees, and assigned their effects. They
also discharged the plaintiff from their service, and gave notice to
11
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the executive department of the Government, that they claimed no
further interest in the charter. By the by-laws, the officers held
their offices for one year, and until others were appointed. The
Court said, the Corporation was not dissolved; and that the plain-
tiff, though one of the Corporation, was not bound by the vote of
the majority. So far as an aggregate corporator, he might be
bound, they say; but treating him as an individual, with individu-
al rigtts, he was not bound by the majority vote. This is a strong
case to show the distinction, and the plaintiff had his damages
allowed him after he was discharged by the majority vote, by reason
of the defendants' refusing to employ him.
The case of the .Hartford and New Haven Bailroad Company v.
Croswell, 5 Hill, 3S5, has an important bearing upon the one before
us. The amendment in that case to the original charter, authorized
the defendant to purchase, hold, and run upon the Sound, steam-
boats in connection with their railway, and gave the Company, for
that purpose, an increase of capital not exceeding $200,000. This
seems to be nothing more or less, so far as principle is concerned,
than an extension of the termin us of the road at New Haven, by
steam power, on the railroad which the God of nature has made,
instead of a railroad by land, constructed by the art of man. This
amendment was accepted both by the Directors of the Company
and by the Corporation, convened for that purpose; and yet it was
held that the alteration wasfundamental, and absolved the defend-
ant from all liability for the assessments on his stock; there being
no evidence that the defcndant had personally assenthd to an
acceptance of the amendment. In that case the assessments *were
made, and had become payable, and had been demanded of the
defendant, before the amendment of the charter. Ch. J. Nelson,
in his opinion, lays down this general proposition, "that corpora-
tions can exercise no power over the corporators, beyond those con-
ferred by the charter to which they have subscribed, except on the
condition of their agreement or consent." .* * *
In -Ellis v. Marslall, 2 Mass. Rep. 269, it was held that no man
could be made, by act of legislation, a member of an aggregate cor-
poration without his personal consent; and the same principle
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would seem to apply, when he is asked to remain and become a cor-
porator under a supplementary act, to be attached to and become a
part of the charter, where that which it is proposed to superadd is
vital, and constitutes a fundamental change in the charter, which
is but the constitution of the Company.
The case of Gray v. .&onongahela N avigation Company, 2 Watts
and Sergeant, 150, has been much relied upon in the defence. The
purpose of the incorporation, as specified in the grant, was to con-
struct a lock navigation on the Monongahela river. In the charter
it was provided that the Company might raise their dams to a
height not exceeding 4 feet; and that no one stockholder should
have, to exceed ten votes. Some three years after the passage of
the act, a supplemental act was passed, taking off the limitation as
to the height of the dams, and permitting them to be raised to a
height not exceeding eight feet, and providing that a share holder
of a given amount might have twenty votes. The plaintiff became
a subscriber for stock, soon after the charter was given, and the
action was for certain instalments. The alteration was at the
request of the Directors. It was claimed that the alteration
changed a most essential feature in the original charter, and would
absolve the defendant below from all obligation to pay his assess-
ments. But the Court held otherwise, and I do not know that I
should differ from them. In regard to the provision in respect to a
change in the ratio of votes, the answer given by the Judge at the
Circuit, in his charge to the jury, would seem to be conclusive.
He says, it was to correct a palpable blunder in the first act, which
made the section obscur6 and contradictory; and if the alteration
disturbed the obligation of ihe contract, the act was so far void,
and the contract left in force. The provision enlarging the license
as to the height of the dams erected in the river, was evidently in
furtherance of the object of the original grant, which was to con-
struct a lock navigation. It might well be said, that the Corpora-
tion had an implied authority to obtain such an amendment to the
original grant.
In this very case, Ch. J. Gibson says, if the amendment extended
to a change in the structure of the association, it would have been
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fatal; and it was so held by that Court in the Indiana and .Ebens-
burgh Turlipike Company v. Phillips, 2 Penn. Rep. 184. The
change in the case of Irvin v. The Turnpike Company, 2 Penn.
Rep. 466, was in the location of a part of the road. This was
held, by three judges against two, not to be such an alteration of
the grant as to be fatal; and that an acceptance of the amendment
by the Corporation would bind the individual corporators.
This case is opposed to the Massachusetts cases, and I am not
called upon to say which I should be disposed to adopt. It is suffi-
cient to say, that in the one case the Court did not consider the
alteration in the charter as a fundamental change in the structure
of the association; while in the other, it was so considered. And
as this preliminary question is determined, so the result must fol-
low. I apprehend neither the case of Lincoln and Kennebec
Bank v. ichardson, 1 Greenleaf, 79, or of Foster et al. v. The
-Essex Bank, 16 Mass. Rep. 245, has any material bearing upon
the question, to show that the plaintiff was bound individually by
the majority vote of this Corporation.
The case of Ware v. The Grand Junction Water Company, 13
Cond. Chan. Rep. 126, has been relied upon to defeat the equity
of this bill. The Vice Chancellor allowed a special injunction, in
the terms of the -prayer of the bill; the first branch of which
restrained the Company from making any application to Parlia-
ment, or taking any other proceedings for obtaining such an altera-
tion in the original charter, as was desired; and the second branch
merely restrained them from carrying those alterations into execu-
tion, independently of such legislative sanction; or from using, or
permitting to be used, the seal, name, funds, credit and officers of
the Company, with a view to effect any such purpose, under their
existing constitution. The Lord Chancellor supported the injunc-
tion of the Vice Chancellor, so far as related to all such acts as
were not authorized by the then present constitution of the Com-
pany; but dissolved'it, so far as to permit the Company, as a qua
corporate body, to apply to Parliament for an alteration in their
charter, so as to authorise the change desired; but restrained them
from applying their corporate funds to that purpose. The Chan-
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cellor proceeded upon the ground, that it was an incidental rigli
in the corporators, as a qua corporation, to apply for such .
change; and that the plaintiff subscribed for stock, subject to such
a contingency; and that all the arguments touching the proposed
change, were proper for a committee of the House of Lords, or
Commons. He evidently goes upon the ground, that Parliament i-
the proper place to meet the question; and that if Parliament
decide to make the alteration proposed, it is binding upon all the
corporators. I apprehend, that the views expressed by the Lord
Chancellor in that case, if sound, must rest upon one of two
grounds: either that the change asked for in the charter was not a
fundamental one, or else upon the ground of the transcendent
powers of a British Parliament. It is evident that Lord Brougham.
in the case of Ware v. Thze Grand Junction Water Works.
grounds himself upon the sovereign and uncontrollable powers of
the Parliament. The change in the charter, asked for in that case.
would, under most, if not all the decisions in this country, b.e
regarded as a fundamental one. The argument of Lord Brougham.
at least in one particular, does not seem very sound. He says:
"The Company ought to have the power of obtaining an alteration
in their constitution, or that the plaintiff ought to have come in a
a member of it under certain conditions and limitations." But
would the conditions and limitations be more sacred than the Con-
stitution itself? and if Parliament might change the constitution.
might they not dispense with the conditions and limitations? See
Amer. Law Mag. vol. 6, p. 98. But with us, no legislature can
transcend the bounds of the constitution.
In the case of Coleman' v. Eastern Counties Bailway Comipa-
nies, 10 Beavans' Rep. page 1, the Directors of the Railway Com-
pany, for the purpose of increasing their business, proposed to
guarantee certain profits, and to secure the capital stock of an
intended steam packet company, who were to act in connection with
the Railroad Company; and it was held not to be within their
power; and they were restrained by injunction, upon the applica-
tion of a shareholder, even though it appeared that the share
holder was suing at the instigation of a rival company. The Mas-
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
ter of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, says, "that such a circumstance,
in itself, was not sufficient to prevent the orator from obtaining a
special injunction, upon the merits of his case." In the recent
case of ilunt v. The Shrewsbury and Chester Railway Company,
3d vol. of English Rep. in Law and Equity, p. 144, the defend-
ants, by various acts of Parliament, were empowered to construct
several railways, and also to build wharves and warehouses, for the
purpose of the traffic of the Company, upon the banks of the river
-Dee. The Railway Company brought a bill into Parliament, to
empower them to improve the navigation of the river -Dee, having
no power to apply any of the capital of the Company to that pur-
pose, under the original charter. Upon the application of a single
shareholder, it was held that the Directors could not apply any of
their funds in improving the navigation of the river Dee, or in pay-
ment of the expenses of getting a bill through Parliament for that
purpose; and an injunction was granted to restrain them from so
-doing. In that case, it was a conceded fact, that the prosperity of
the;'ailway Company depended materially upon the navigation of
the river being kept in good condition, and that it was then in a
state -of deterioration; and the Company had actually expended
two thousand pounds upon the river before the bill was brought.
The Master of the Rolls says, "so far as the power of a Court of
Chancery extends, it has unalterably decided, that companies pos-
sessed of funds for objects which are distinctly defined by act of
Parliament, cannot be allowed to apply them to any other purpose
whatever, however beneficial or advaiitageous it may appear to be
to the Company, or to individual members of the Company." The
injunction not only stayed them from expending any further sums
of money upon the river, but from applying to Parliament for an
alteration of the charter, at the expense of the Corporation.
If, in a case like the present, the majority cannot bind the mino-
rity, it is plain that there is an equity in this bill, and that the
defendants can stand in no better situation than if they hiad, by a
vote of the Company, proceeded to build the extension, and to
apply the funds and credit of the Corporation to that purpose,
without any additional act of the Legislature. The case of Living-
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stone v. Lynch , et al., 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 573, was the case of a
voluntary association, under the name of the North River Steam
Boat Company; and a majority, without the consent of the mino-
rity, changed, by a vote, the articles of association, and proceeded
in their business according to their new articles. The bill was
brought by the plaintiff against the majority of the Company, to
have the rights of the association reinstated on their former basis;
and the Chancellor decreed the new articles null and void, and set
up the old articles, and enjoined all further proceedings under the
new articles. In the case of Natusch v. Irving et al.,' which was
also the case of a voluntary association, an injunction was allowed
to restrain them from going into a business not within the scope of
the original articles, in pursuance of a vote of the majority. And
in that case, before the hearing, the defendant had offered to pay
back all that the orator had paid into the Company, with interest
from the daie of the payment, and also to fully indemnify him
against all loss, by the transactions of the Company, already had or
thereafter to be had, in the business, which was beyond their ori-
ginal articles. Lord Eldon, to this part of the case, replies, in sub-
stance, that it is not competent for any number of persons, in a
partnership (unless so provided for,) formed for specified purposes,
to effect that formation by calling upon some of their partners to
receive back their capital stock and interest, and quit the concern-
which, in effect, would be merely compelling them to retire upon
such terms as should be dictated to them, so as to form a new
Company; and that it is the right of a partner to hold his associ-
ates to the specified purposes, whilst the partnership continues, and
not to rest upon indemnities with respect to what he had not con-
tracted to engage in; and that a partner cannot be compelled to
part with his shares, though for double what he originally gave for
'them; and that it may be his principal reason for keeping them, to
have the partnership carried on according to the original contract.
This doctrine of Lord Chancellor Eldon necessarily grows out of
the doctrine, that it is the business of the courts of justice to
' Reported in the appendix to Gow. Part. 576.
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enforce the contracts of parties, vot matke them. To give to courts
not only the power to enforce, but also the power to make, or even
modify in one iota a contract fairly made, would be the rankest
despotism.
I am not ready to suppose the Directors, in procuring the act of
1850 to be pas-ed, or the Corporation, in accepting that act, actcd
in bad faith to any of the old stockholders; but doubtless they were
governed by the most honorable, motives, and meant it for the best
good of all concerned, notwithstanding the allegations in the bill.
The case is not put at all upon the allegations in the bill, imputing
bad faith to the Directors in obtaining the act of 1850. If it was,
it would be very material to the merits of the question that the bill
should be answered. The ground assumed is, that this Corporation
had the funds of the original stockholders for an object distinctly
defined in the original charter, and that they cannot be allowed to
appl7 them to any other purpose whatever, without the consent of
the stockholders; and that, to do it, would be a breach of trust.* *
Where it is clearly shown that a corporation is about to exceed
its puwers, and to apply their funds or credit to some object beyond
their authority, it would, if the purpose of the Corporation was car-
ried out, constitute a breach of trust ; and a court of equity cannot
refuse to give relief by injunction. See Aagar v. The regent's
Canal Company, Cooper's Equity Rep. 77. The River Dan .Navi-
gation Companil v. Yorth -iidland -Railway Comalmny, 1 Railway
Cases, 153-4. The case from the 1st vol. of Railway Cases was
before the Lord Chancellor, and he uses this language: "If these
companies go beyond the powers which the Legislature has given
them, and in a mistaken exercise of those powers, interfere with the
property of individuals, this Court is bound to interfere; and that
was Lord Eldon's ground in Aagar v. the Reyent's Canal Com-
yany. The Lord Chancellor further adds: "I am not at liberty
(even if I were in the least disposed, which I am not,) to withhold
the jurisdiction of this Court, as exercised in the case of Aagar v.
The Regent's Canal Company." In that case Lord Eldon pro-
ceeded simply on the ground that it was necessary to exercise this
jurisdiction of chancery for the purpose of keeping these companies
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within the powers which the acts give them. And it is added:
"And a most wholesome exercise of the jurisdiction it is; because,
great as the powers necessarily qre, to enable the companies to
carry into effect works of this magnitude, it would be most prejudi-
cial to the interests of all persons with whose property they inter-
fere, if there was not a jurisdiction continually open, and ready to
exercise its power to keep them within their legitimate limits."
It cannot justify the Chancellor in refusing to exercise the jurisdic-
tion of chancery, because the defendants may claim the right to
proceed under color of the act of 1850. It is a settled principle,
that the circumstance of the defendant's acting under color of law,
simply, can form no justification. The question, after all, will be;
does the law justify the act which is being done, or threatened to
be done? Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton,
738. If a law is unconstitutional, it can give no authority. If the
power it confers is abused or exceeded, the person acting under the
color of law is a wrong doer. In the case at bar the Corporation
had no power to build the extension under their original charter;
and the act of 1850 is not binding upon the orator without his
consent.
The injunction must, therefore, be allowed; but only so far as to
restrain the defendants, until the further order of the Chancellor,
from applying the present funds of the Corporation, or their income
from their present road, either directly or indirectly, to the pur-
pose of building said extension in said road, or to pay land damages
and other expenses which may be contingent upon the building of
it; and also from using-or pledging, directly or indirectly, the cre-
dit of the Corporation in effecting the object of the extension; and
at the same time, the Company will be left at liberty to build the
extension with any new funds which they may see fit to obtain for
that specific object.'
'It is due to the learned Judge who delivered this able and elaborate opinion, to
say that it is not printed in this Journal entire. Its length was such asto forbid it.
It is believed, however, that every material part is here presented. Eds. Am. L.
Reg.
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Supreme Gourt of Pennsylvania, -December, 1852.
HUTCHINSON V. M'CLURE, ET. AL.
A judgment confessed or conveyance made for an antecedent debt, by a debtor in
insolvent circumstances, and in contemplation of an assignment, with intent to
evade the act of 1843, in regard to preferences in assignments, is not avoided by
the proviso in the act of 1849, where the creditor had no knowledge of, nor par-
ticipated in the unlawful intent. Summers' Appeal, 4 Harris, 169, overruled.
Error to Erie County.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.
LEwIs, J.-This is an issue directed to the Common Pleas of
Erie County, to try whether Monroc Iutchinson, assignee of Squire
Hall, is entitled to priority over John McClure, Steward C. Marsh
and Alexander Freer, in the distribution of the fund raised by the
sale of personal property of Hall, under execution in favor of the
creditors last named.
On the 1st of August, 1846, Hall was indebted to MeClure on a
promissory note given for the purchase of a stock of goods at
Cranesville, and on the 10th August, 1849, gave a single bill for
the amount, with power to confess judgment. On the 8th Decem-
ber, 1848, he was indebted to McClure on another promissory note
for goods at Girard, and on the 5th May, 1851, gave a single bill
for the amount, payable within twenty days from date, with power
to confess judgment. On the 4th August, 1851, both these debts
were included in a judgment bond, and on the 18th August, 1851
judgment was entered on the bond, and execution issued.
On the 7th of July, 1851, Hall gave Marsh and Freer a bond,
with power to confess judgment, for an indebtedness which arose two
years before, for goods purchased in New York. On this bond
judg.ent was entered on the 16th of August, 1851, and execution
issued.
By virtue of these two executions, the goods of Hall were seized
and sold by the sheriff. The sale commenced on the 1st Septem-
ber, 1851. On that day, while the sheriff was actually selling the
goods, Hall executed an assignment, for the benefit of creditors, to
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Hutchinson, the plaintiff. This assignment was not recorded until
the 29th September, 1851, and the bond of the assignee was not
approved until the 29th April, 1852. There was no evidence tend-
ing to show that the debts claimed by McClure, and Marsh, and
Freer were not justly due, or that in attaining their judgment
bonds, or in afterwards entering judgment on them, they had any
intention to evade the provisions of the Act of 1843, relative to
assignments. It did not clearly appear that Hall, when he gave
these judgment bonds, respectively, on the 7th July and 4th August,
contemplated an assignment, or even knew that he was insolvent.
But, conceding that he had such knowledge, and entertained, at
the time, an intention to make an assignment, how is that to affect
an honest creditor who had no knowledge of any such purpose, and
had no participation in the intention to evade the Act of 1843?
In IFormam et al. v. TJofersberger, -Esq., (a case in the middle
district not yet reported,) it was shown that, according to all the
decisions upon statutes enacted to prevent frauds upon creditors,
the party who obtained a security or a conveyance, in good faith,
was not affected by, unless they participated in, the wrongful intent
of the debtor in giving it, and was declared that the doctrine in
Summers' Appeal, 4 Harris, 169, "Was a departure from the prin-
ciples which had usually governed the courts in the construction of
statutes similar to the proviso in the act of 1849, and that there was
something so revolting to the most ordinary sense of justice in
depriving any one of a vested right-a lien for a just debt-without
any fault of his own, that it ought not to be done, except in obedi-
ence to the plain and imperative mandate of a power not to be
resisted." Is there any such "plain and imperative mandate" in the
'Act of 1849? Far from it. Even the learned Judge, who engraft-
ed upon it the construction in question, admits, in his opinion, that
the act is "exceedingly obscure," and that there is but "a glim-
mering" of such "intent" in it. 4 Harris, 174. And the legisla-
tive and executive departments, so far from admitting the existence
of any such intent, within less than a year after the decision was
pronounced, repealed the proviso upon which it was founded, and
thus extinguished the ignis fatuus which had led the judicial mind
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astray. Although this repeal cannot operate retrospectively upon
right. which had previously vested, the judgment of the other
branches of government, in cases admitting of doubt, is certainly to
be treated with respectful consideration.
The decision in Summers' Ap~peal was a departure from the great
principle which requires that statutes in derogation of the common
law shall receive a strict construction. It was pronounced in mani-
fest forgetfulness.of an uninterrupted current of authority upon the
construction of similar clauses in statutes to prevent frauds upon
creditors. It was an invasion, without legislative warrant, of the
long established right of the citizen, where he has not surrendered
the dominion over his property to others, to conduct his affairs in
his own way. It was a violation of a maxim of universal justice,
which declares that no one shall suffer for another's fault-remo
vniri debet pro alieno delicto. Its tendency is to produce uncer-
tainty and litigation; and its result, if adhered to, would be to
throw into confusion the plain business transactions of a community
whose commercial enterprises prosper most when left to their own
activity, intelligence and vigilance. In overruling it we correct a
plain mi-take-we affirm as a principle not to be denied, that the
judicial power is not authorised to make new. and inconvenient inno-
vations upon the rights of the people, or to alter the law of the
land upon a mere "glimmering" of legislative intent; and we
replace ourselves upon ancient foundations, in accordance with the
true doctrine of stare decisis, and in obedience to the authoritative
voice of the law.
As the plaintiffs below failed to make out even a prima facie
case, the defendants were entitled to a positive direction in their
favor. It follows that the error in admitting the deposition of Hall,
even if a bill of exception had been scaled, would furnish no ground
for reversing the judgment.
The judgment on the verdict, and decree of distribution are
affirmed.
NOTE.- We s.ubjoin that portion of the opinion of the Court in Wornian v. Wolfers-
lerger. r'fhrred to above by the learned Judge:
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"At common law, a debtor, in failing circumstances, so long as lie holds dtomin-
ion over his property, has an undoubted right to prefer one creditor over another.
'Many debts are contracted with a knowledge of the existence of this right, and upon
the full confidence that it will be exercised to secure those who have the strongest
claims upon the conscience, and even upon the gratitude of the debtor. Loans
made from motives of friendship, and endorsements and other liabilities incurred as
surety, without expectation of profit, are of this character. At least, they are so
esteemed by the community in general, and any enactment which takes away the
right of a debtor to prefer them, would produce a sudden change, so extensive in all
business transactions, that its policy is somewhat questionable. The project is sup-
ported by a refinement in morals which is certainly in advance of the commercial
spirit of the age in which we live. At all events, a change so important in the com-
mercial dealings of the people, ought not to be put into operation by the Courts,
until the legislative will, to that effect, be plainly expressed." * * *
After remarking on the Acts of 1843 and 1849, the Judge proceeds: "According
to all the decisions upon statutes enacted to prevent frauds upon creditors, the party
who obtained a security or conveyance in good faith was not affected by the wrong-
ful intent of the debtor in giving it, unless the former participated in it. This was
the construction of the English statutes of 13th and 27th Elizabeth, upon the clauses
which made void grants, &c., ' made with the intention to deceive, &c., purchasers
and creditors.' The same principle was decided in Massachusetts, Green v. Tanner,
8 Met. 411; in New York, Sands v. Hildreth, 14 John. 493; in South Carolina,
Union Bank v. Toomer, 2 Hill's Ch. 27; in Alabama, Stover v. Herrington, 7 Ala.
142; in MIississippi, Pope v. Andrews, 1 S. & M. 135; in Indiana, Frakes v. Brown,
2 Blackf. 295, and in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon- the statute of
Illinois, Astor v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 466. But in Summer's Appeal, 4 Harris, 109, it
was held, in a case where a debtor had made an assignment for the benefit of cre-
ditors, that the validity of a judgment previously given, 'hinged entirely upon the
scienter of the debtor, as to his solvency or insolvency at the time he gave the judg-
ment,' and the 'knowledge of the creditor' did not seem 'to enter into the account.'
This was certainly a departure from the principles which had usually governed the
courts in the construction of similar statutes. There is something so revolting to
the most ordinary sense of justice, in depriving any one of a vested right-a lien for
a just debt-without any fault of his own, that it ought not to be done except in
obedience to the plain and imperative mandate of a power which cannot be resisted.
The injustice of the principle engrafted upon the Act of 1849, by the decision last
mentioned, produced, without doub4 the repeal of the proviso from which it sprang,
within less than a year after the decision. Under such circumstances, its weight as
a precedent will be open for consideration when the question arises."
